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observers, the game, as an objective, inter-individual fact, is controlled not by reason, but by the laws of the game. And so it is in the history of society, where chance is antithetic, not antagonistic to law.

M. Bouglé finds in Cournot a contribution to the dispute that, since his day, has waged to the point of tediousness, in which '*historiens-historisaunts*' have had to show that they can be scientists without being a subspecies of sociologist. Cournot thus describes the field of historical science, at least in part.

It deals rather with 'cosmological' or empirical laws than with theoretical or rational laws. That all mammals have seven cervical vertebræ is of the former class; that revolving fluid bodies tend to flatten at the poles, of the latter. The historian notes, too, the characteristics that prevail together at any time, and, also, wherever events repeat themselves in part, though his observations here attain to no universality; he notes the general direction and tendency of events, distinguishing therein, too, what is more important.

A task particularly pertaining to the historian because of the nature of his material, where chance and individuality play so great a rôle, is to distinguish the underlying *reasons* for an event from the 'efficient agents' or causes; and to note both those cases where those underlying reasons are so predominant that in the course of time the proper and efficient agent for their execution must appear, and also those cases, for such there are, where, in the balance of those impersonal forces, the great individual is revealed as a real, determining power, an incalculable element, whether in his presence or in his absence.

In history society is an active principle, working out its own laws distinct from those of the constituent individuals. Each society tends more and more to conform to laws common to all societies.

M. Bouglé objects that we can only speak of a society as a cause, when we know the law common to all societies under which it works. In general he objects to 'abysmal' separations of one science from another. There is but one type of law and science fundamentally.

PERCY HUGHES.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

Traité de l'infini créé (Translation). NORMAN SMITH. *Philosophical Review,* Vol. XIV., No. 4, July, 1905, pp. 456–471.

This treatise, once ascribed to Malebranche, but now thought to have been written by Abbé Jean Terrasson, and proposing to clarify and develop the Cartesian notion of the 'indefinite,' has for its thesis 'that everything in nature—matter, spirit, number, duration—is actually and positively infinite.' The perfection, power and wisdom of God guarantee the actuality of an infinite, since any but an infinite result, as well as mode of action, are unthinkable on this presupposition. Furthermore, God has given us the idea of an infinite, and He would not give us ideas of non-existent things.

The argument in the sections on *Matter* and *Created Spirits* is altogether Cartesian. Matter is nothing but extension, and extension is intrinsically an infinite conception since it can have no limits. Infinites differ one from another; the infinity of matter is different from that of spirit. God's infinitude is altogether different from that of created beings. 'God is infinitely infinite.' Created spirit knows both matter and God—both infinites. If the known is infinite, then the knower must have some sort of infinity in order to have any notion of them. Furthermore, the goodness of God makes it impossible that God should discriminate and give infinity to matter and not to mind.

Concerning Number.—Descartes's 'indefinite' number of planets is increased to an infinite number. There is an infinite number of creatures in the universe, and these are men, for 'it would be needless for matter to be infinite unless it were made use of by intelligent creatures. . . . Now as the inhabitants of this earth can only profit by a very small part of the universe, there must be other intelligent creatures who profit by the rest.' The objection that this is untenable on account of the difficulty of redemption for the inhabitants of these planets, is met by the assertion of a possible plural hypostatical union of God and men. Again, suppose the inhabitants of some of the planets had not sinned, on the postulate of the goodness of God, it is more probable that God would have sent His greatest blessing to mankind, viz., a Savior, to those sinless planets than to the sinners, and yet he has given the boon to the latter also.

Let us digress for the moment; if we carry this argument further, it will lead toward pessimism for the planets where there is sin. In addition, how, on the basis of the goodness of God—the central principle of the whole argument—can he account for the existence of sin on one planet and not on all? How does this square with his earlier argument that mind is infinite because God would not discriminate in favor of matter?

To return to the treatise. *Concerning Duration.*—Matter as a whole must endure. Change is merely a change of form, for planets are disintegrated and others formed, but the general type persists. The destruction of a planet involves the resurrection of all the men inhabiting it. These become angels.

His cosmogony is: 'God at every moment creates an infinity of spirits. . . . If God commences at this moment to create an infinity of spirits, He must give all of them bodies. For this purpose alone, then, he must create an infinite matter. . . . The universe being thus arranged, God creates, the moment following, another infinity of spirits.' This process continually involves a corresponding and infinite increase in the creation of matter. Therefore, 'we can conceive, not only of an actual infinite, but also that God can infinitely increase the infinite.'

The first principle of the whole treatise 'is that God . . . always does that which He can do, and He can only act in doing all that He can do. There is nothing, our system maintains, merely possible, and all that can be, is, or one day will be.' In conclusion, we may say that the whole argument rests upon this principle. If we accept this as necessary, and also decide that such terms as the 'infinitely infinite,' and the statement, 'the infinite increases infinitely' are not mere logomachies, but logically and ontologically possible, then the author's conclusion must have great weight for our own thought.

PHILIP H. FOGEL.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

Note sur la classification des connaissances humaines dans Comte et dans Cournot. R. AUDIERNE. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,* May, 1905. Pp. 509–519.

Both Comte and Cournot were influenced by that interest in social science which was the fruit of the Revolution and of the revival of history. Comte was impelled by a love of unification and by optimistic faith in the power of mind to reduce all laws to one general character and perfection. '*L'esprit antinomique*' of Cournot, on the contrary, recognized in the material furnished by history elements that are in themselves not amenable to expression in a general form, and in the laws that may be found he saw irreducible specific characters that give to the several sciences methods of their own, rather than, as in Comte's system, several degrees of perfection in attaining the one true method, the mathematical.

Cournot, therefore, rejected Comte's scale or ladder of the sciences. The social sciences no doubt depend on the progress of the biological, but only in part; for the former have in the science of order, combinations and probabilities an instrument of their own through which their advance has lately been more rapid than that of the latter. Moreover, he notes that, as regards simplicity and susceptibility to mathematical treatment, the social sciences at one end of the scale approach more nearly to the astronomical at the other than do the sciences that intervene, and that this mathematical, calculable character applies most of all to the highest and most complicated types of society, and will increase with the perfection and complexity of social life.

With these general differences in mind we may note that to Comte's three divisions, the practical sciences, the abstract-theoretical and the concrete-theoretical, correspond Cournot's divisions, the technical sciences, the 'speculative théorique' or natural, and the 'speculative-cosmological' or historical. Comte and Cournot both class empirical psychology as a biological science, both recognize the legitimacy of certain sociological studies still termed psychological, and both condemn as unscientific the 'subjective,' introspective method, and on similar grounds.

Neither Comte nor Cournot classes philosophy as a science. Comte, however, dominated by his belief in the homogeneity of knowledge, looked on philosophy as simply the unity of the sciences, requiring no distinct treatment. Cournot holds a different and a very interesting view on this point. Philosophy is not science, because it is neither essentially progressive nor rigorously impersonal. It is the product of a special capacity that unites with the scientific in the natural development of intellectual activity. Its results are not to be verified by sensible experience, but are to be affirmed by the 'philosophic sense.' It is as essential to the perfection of human nature as is science or art.

PERCY HUGHES.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.